Author: Ana Uzelac
Affiliated organization: Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Type of publication: Policy Brief
Date of publication: June 2019
Introduction
European Union (EU) policies towards Africa have in the past years experienced a shift away from forging relations based on trade and development, to cooperation based on and measured by the successes of joint migration management. This shift has been producing often controversial outcomes for the EU, African countries and migrants themselves. Just under four years since the pivotal Valetta Summit on migration, the evidence base of these policies’ poor human rights record is growing, as is the evidence base on their localised adverse economic and societal impact.
The impact of EU policies on the regional integration processes in Africa – once a pillar of the EU’s Africa strategy – has, however, not yet been sufficiently documented. But the emerging evidence and policy analysis strongly suggest that the EU policies in West Africa have the power to create incentives and even localised policy outcomes that could in the medium-term challenge ECOWAS commitments to freedom of movement, and in that way also likely slow down the processes of regional economic and political integration.
Paradoxically, the EU policies aimed at curbing migration may thus also end up slowing down the development processes in West Africa that the EU perceives as one of the key approaches to tackling the root causes of migration. It may also lead to a weakening of the existing economic coping mechanisms within these countries, and thereby potentially also to increased migratory pressures.
Paradigm Shift: from Cotonou to Valetta
For a period of over two decades, the relations between the EU and the countries of West Africa have been based on economic development, trade, and peace and security as the main pillars of cooperation. The main formal basis for this cooperation was the Cotonou Agreement between the countries of the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries), first signed in 2000 and then updated in 2005 and 2010.
The Cotonou agreement both recognised and encouraged the ongoing regional integration in West Africa and the ongoing cross-border economic ties in the region. The seminal 2017 OECD report on crossborder cooperation and policies in West Africa describes the extent of this integration – and also dwells on the nature and specifics of cross-border economic dependencies between local populations. Such economic dependencies include lively cross-border trade, seasonal migration and even a physical and governance infrastructure that supports cross-border economic activities. The report notes especially high cooperation and future potential for even more cross-border-driven economic development in the Sahel area.
Intra-ECOWAS migration is an important element of these cross-border economic patterns, with some countries – specifically Senegal and Nigeria – standing out for their attractiveness as a destination for seasonal labour and a source of remittances for poorer West African countries, such as Cote d’Ivoire or the Gambia. In other countries, such as Mali or Niger, the economic model of many cattle-herding or cross-border trading communities is based on their mobility and low transactional costs of moving across the national borders.
The updated 2010 agreement further strengthened the focus on economic development, specifically towards encouraging regional integration and improving trade conditions. The Cotonou Agreement shifted the dialogue between the ACP countries and the EU towards reciprocal trade relations and introduced the policy of performance-based funding. At the same time, it recognized the importance of trade relationships between and inside specific regions within the ACP countries, including ECOWAS, and built a legal structure to support the mutually beneficial trade relations inside and between these regions.
In the case of ECOWAS, the specifics of trade relations were worked out in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and ECOWAS, striving to regulate the relations between ECOWAS countries and the EU as well as to support regional integration by obliging the ECOWAS countries to give each other the same trade benefits as they would give to the EU. The agreement, however, hasn’t been ratified by all ECOWAS counties: Nigeria has thus far blocked the ratification of the regional EPA, driven by fears of weakening the manufacturing sector as a result of lowering the import tariffs on EU goods, and citing equity and industrialisation concerns as key motivations for not signing the agreement. Only two ECOWAS countries – Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire – have thus far signed modified bilateral “individual” versions of EPAs.
While there has been much criticism levelled at the Cotonou agreement and the EPAs, both among EU officials and the West African countries, there was also recognition that the logic of this agreement was based on a negotiated understanding of common interests – and the West African countries’ own understanding of their economic development priorities.
The Unintended: Consequences of the new EU policies on regional dynamics in ECOWAS
Localised negative outcomes While large-scale statistical data may still be lacking, there is a growing patchwork of evidence pointing at the series of localised negative outcomes that the EU migration management policies have had on local livelihoods in some countries of West Africa.
Specifically, most of the field-based evidence comes from Niger, which has been the focus of EU migration management interventions in the Sahel, and the most cooperative of all ECOWAS countries. In the years following the implementation of the law criminalising human smugglers facilitating the migrant flow from the smuggling industry’s hub of Agadez towards Libya and Algeria, the economic impact has been felt across the city’s many communities. The migration industry, once counting 6000 people and bringing income to more than half of the Agadez households, providing work for numerous transport services and supporting local industries, has quickly dried out, without viable alternatives or replacements. EU-supported migration policies have also pitted local authorities in Agadez against their populations – coordinated and implemented with authorities in Niger’s capital, Niamey, rather than the region itself, they are being perceived as “serving the EU’s interest”, not the population’s.
The impact of these projects has not yet been recognised in the mainstream political and economic discourse. There are many potential reasons for this – the impact of the projects may still need to be felt, or the projects have only limited impact. Another potential reason has to do with incentives – the local government may have a vested interest in maintaining the narrative of insufficient aid in order to maximize its access to various new funding streams. All of these are indicative of the challenges to come, and the risks of using migration management as the main frame for discussing development.
Similar challenges arise for the governance structures in other ECOWAS countries, for instance Senegal, where cooperation with the EU on some aspects of migration management, such as returns, due to the importance of diaspora and remittances in the country’s development model, would be a risky and potentially delegitimizing move for any of the countries’ governments.
Creation of potentially negative incentives
Many of the localized outcomes described above are indicative of the negative incentives being created by the new EU policy focus on ECOWAS countries. With a lot of immediate benefits stemming from complying with the EU migration management policy designs, some of the West African countries have found themselves in a position where implementing the ECOWAS policies on the freedom of movement may result in forgoing some of the potential economic benefits offered by a parallel EU instrument. That said, the size of the EUTF has so far not been comparable to the EDF budget, so the real challenges lie ahead, as the EU decides on the size and incentives behind its future policy instruments past the 2020 mark.
Freedom of movement is not a silver-bullet solution for ECOWAS’ economic woes – with ongoing trade tariffs between the countries, poor infrastructure, a low level of industrialisation and considerable wealth differences inside and between individual ECOWAS countries, the region is struggling with a myriad of issues that pose major structural challenges to development.
EU Policy Coherence
Policy coherence is an EU principle enshrined in some of its most important policy documents, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It was defined and listed as a guiding principle in the European Consensus on Development, which has committed the EU to strengthening “policy coherence for development (PCD) procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels,” and securing adequate resources to see this policy objective through. The importance of PCD was also confirmed in the new European Consensus on Development, adopted in 2017, as a “fundamental part of the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs.” The Consensus again committed the EU and its Member States to “apply the principle PCD,” and to “take into account the objectives of development cooperation in all external and internal policies which they implement and which are likely to affect developing countries.”
Regional integration in Africa has long been identified as one of these strategic goals, shared by both the EU and African states, with a special mention in the Cotonou Agreement. The EU has reiterated its commitment to regionalism as a development strategy also in its agenda with the African Union. More importantly, African countries themselves have long endorsed regional integration as a development strategy – albeit it with significant hurdles along the way and inconsistent commitments by individual member states. Within ECOWAS, trade integration has been particularly difficult to implement, and the implementation of the free movement commitment has also faced its fair share of challenges.
African states and European donors have in the past decades been moving in the general direction of improved regional integration. This, however, may no longer be the case – especially not from the EU side, where regional integration discourse and the development-based paradigm have given way to discourse and policies centred around migration management, especially in the ECOWAS’ Sahel area.
African states and European donors have in the past decades been moving in the general direction of improved regional integration. This, however, may no longer be the case – especially not from the EU side, where regional integration discourse and the development-based paradigm have given way to discourse and policies centred around migration management, especially in the ECOWAS’ Sahel area.
Conclusion
While EU officials may privately recognize the internally contradictory character of the Union’s recent interventions in West Africa, the EU’s migration management agenda appears to trump more nuanced considerations of its localized or longer-term impacts.
This could, in turn, lead to a weakening of the overall regional integration project – which seems to be losing priority in the EU’s eyes. Paradoxically the EU policies aimed at curbing migration may slow down the development processes that the EU perceives as one of the root causes of migration (whether this is true or not). It may also lead to a weakening of economic coping mechanisms within these countries, leading to increased potential migratory pressures.
Therefore, a regional framework for human mobility in Africa is needed that would allow for the development of sustainable European migration management policies across the region. Such policies would serve not just the EU’s but also the region’s needs and be attuned to its patterns of mobility and economic coping mechanisms. These policies should also be conflict-sensitive and based on a thorough understanding of their short/mid/long-term consequences on the full range of political and economic issues of importance to the region – from affecting livelihood patterns to human rights fallout to possible long-term macroeconomic consequences. For this reason, it is important to also maintain and strengthen the existing monitoring mechanisms across West Africa and to encourage an informed policy debate, both in the EU and in ECOWAS, on issues of such pivotal importance to both regions.
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