Authors : Eric Rosand, Khalid Koser, and Lilla Schumicky-Logan

Affiliated organization : Brookings

Type of publication : Article

Date of publication : April 28, 2020

Link to the original document

While the world’s attention appropriately focuses on the health and economic impacts of COVID-19, the threat of violent extremism remains, and has in some circumstances been exacerbated during the crisis. The moment demands new and renewed attention so that the gains made to date do not face setbacks.

Headlines over the past few weeks have suggested that violent extremist and terrorist groups ranging from Colombian hit squads to ISIS affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa to far-right extremists in the United States are watching the disruption caused by COVID-19. Many are at least aware of the potential to benefit from that disruption, and in some cases they are already taking advantage.

As with so much reporting on and analysis of the pandemic, however, there is a shortage of data and evidence to support the headlines. The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), where two of the authors work, has surveyed 50 local NGOs it supports to build community resilience against violent extremism in eight developing countries worldwide, to try to understand the nature of the threat. Six themes recur.

First, in most communities surveyed, with many schools closed and recreational and cultural activities suspended, most young people are now confined to their homes, and are spending even more time online. Their frustration, combined with a rapid growth of online vitriol, makes them more vulnerable to online radicalization to violent extremist agendas.

Second, ill-founded rumors and suspicions abound that the pandemic has been caused, or at least spread, by minorities in the community whether herders in the Middle Belt in Nigeria or Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. This echoes the ongoing efforts of right-wing extremist groups in the United States, who blame Jews for the spread of the virus. Some even seek to motivate their supporters to take violent action.

Third, community policing one of the most effective early warning signs of violent extremism and a critical tool to address one of the most commonly identified drivers of radicalization to violence (heavy-handed police tactics) has reduced in many communities. Where it is maintained, it now focuses on enforcing lockdowns. There have been reports from Nigeria and Sri Lanka that vigilante groups are filling the vacuum. In some instances, such as Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda, the response of security actors has risked exacerbating the crisis. They have reportedly included tear gas and beatings, resulting in dozens of injuries and possibly exposing many more to COVID-19.

Fourth, there are concerns that the impacts of the pandemic and as the situation in a number of African countries highlights government responses may exacerbate some of the underlying drivers for radicalization to violent extremism. More people will become unemployed, fewer people will be educated, and the marginalized are becoming more so. At the same time, religious, cultural, and other gatherings that can foster an individual sense of purpose, strengthen social cohesion, and bolster community resilience against these risks are no longer occurring.

First, in most communities surveyed, with many schools closed and recreational and cultural activities suspended, most young people are now confined to their homes, and are spending even more time online. Their frustration, combined with a rapid growth of online vitriol, makes them more vulnerable to online radicalization to violent extremist agendas

Fifth, there are indications that community confidence in local authorities is also flagging, especially as local health facilities collapse. In fact, there are reports that in some countries violent extremist groups are providing public health services and filling the vacuum. Building the capacities of local authorities and bridging the confidence gap between communities and such authorities have been some of the most significant successes of initiatives to prevent violent extremism in recent years, providing a network of local actors to identify concerning behaviors of those who may be heading towards violence and steer them down a non-violent path.

The current pandemic may even knock terrorism from the top of the threat chart for many governments, and signal an end to the “post-9/11 era.” It may precipitate a long-overdue end to the “endless wars” and, more broadly, the heavily militarized counterterrorism efforts since September 2001.

At the same time, for all the above reasons, it is essential to maintain and even increase investments in preventing violent extremism in the current climate. But this is not happening.

The foreign aid budgets that tend to support preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives are being diverted to COVID-19. The lessons of the global financial crisis are that there may be a significant dip in funding for overseas development for the next 18 to 24 months. Many of the traditional activities that PVE interventions rely on interfaith dialogues, training and education, employment schemes involve in-person interactions and simply cannot currently take place. And non-governmental organizations and charities that directly support PVE are themselves cutting back as a result of budget pressure and needing to allocate some of their limited resources to protect themselves and their communities against the virus.

In the short term, existing PVE projects could be adjusted to allow for more agile programming such as online  or over cell phone (e.g., WhatsApp) instead of in-person gatherings. Schools, sports clubs, and the private sector are developing ways to adjust to the “new normal”: keeping students, members, and employees engaged at home. Depending on the local implementing partner, unforeseen training and technology may be required to enable the transition, and donors should be flexible.

In the medium term, more attention should be given to building the capacities of local NGOs and local communities more broadly. They should become better positioned to address their priorities without being so reliant on international donor funding which is likely to be more fragile going forward and more resilient to future external shocks.

The foreign aid budgets that tend to support preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives are being diverted to COVID-19

In the longer term, the current public health crisis and dwindling development budgets may help catalyze a long-overdue move beyond the siloed approach that has characterized funding in the peace, security, and development spheres. Donors have often relied on disparate funding streams to support work on the different global agendas, whether related to PVE; conflict prevention; preventing gender-based violence; protecting human rights; youth empowerment; or women, peace, and security.

In the longer term, the current public health crisis and dwindling development budgets may help catalyze a long-overdue move beyond the siloed approach that has characterized funding in the peace, security, and development spheres. Donors have often relied on disparate funding streams to support work on the different global agendas, whether related to PVE; conflict prevention; preventing gender-based violence; protecting human rights; youth empowerment; or women, peace, and security.

Going forward, international development assistance should be viewed less as a zero-sum game about which priorities to fund and more about how to make better use of the increasingly limited resources to address multiple ones. In many cases, it should be about investing in local communities and NGOs to allow them to do so, while gradually becoming self-reliant. At the end of the day, this shift may be necessary to ensure that PVE continues to get the attention it merits in a post-COVID-19 world where the threat of extremist violence remains.

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